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II 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Jurisdiction is conferred by Title 78, Chapter 2, Section 2, 
Subsection (5) U.C.A. authorizing review by the Supreme Court of 
Utah of the decisions of the Court of Appeals by Writ of 
Certiorari and under Subsection (3)(j) of Section 2. This case 
was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to 78-2a-3 (2) (j) U.C.A. after appeal from the District 
Court tor Summit County, Utah. 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in a civil quiet title action originally filed and tried 
to the Court sitting without a jury in the District Court for 
Summit County. 
Ill 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals misapply the standard for 
appellate review of the facts in a civil case when it construed 
conflicting facts opposite the findings of fact by the trial 
judge. 
2. May the common law doctrine of laches bar a co-tenant 
from asserting rights to real property in litigation against 
another co-tenant. 
3. May the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel be 
used to prevent a defense against adverse possession by a 
co-tenant. 
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4. May a prescriptive easement be defeated by evidence of 
permission to use from a non-owner of the contested land. 
IV 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There do not appear to be any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations of administrative 
bodies whose interpretation is determinative, however, the Court 
must interpret the provisions of 78-12-7, of the Utah Code which 
is set forth below: 
"78-12-7 Adverse possession - possession presumed 
in owner 
In every action for the recovery of real 
property, or the possession thereof, the person 
establishing a legal title to the property shall 
be presumed to have been possessed thereof within 
the time required by law; and the occupation of 
the property by any other person shall be deemed 
to have been under and in subordination to the 
legal title, unless it appears that the property 
has been held and possessed adversely to such 
legal title for seven years before the commence-
ment of this action." 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a quiet title case filed by Sweeney Land Company 
pursuant to the provisions of 78-40-1, Utah Code Annotated 
against Gilbert and Maud Kimball and Melvin and Peggy Fletcher. 
The Kimball's Counterclaimed against Sweeney and Crossclaimed 
against the Fletchers and the Fletchers1 Crossclaimed and Coun-
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terclaimed against Sweeney Land Company and the Kimballs. The 
land at issue is principally the rear yard of the Fletcher's 
home, 
Gilbert and Maud Kimball claimed title based on a 1940 deed 
from Summit County to Robert Kimball and Gilbert Kimball as 
co-tenants and served summons by publication on all unnamed 
parties, including Robert Kimball's successors• The Fletchers 
notified the surviving heir of Robert Kimball of the action and 
during the pendancy of the proceedings acquired the interest of 
Robert Kimball which had passed to his heir, Elizabeth Kimball. 
Trial was held on September 5 and 6th, 1985 to the Court. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Quiet Title 
were entered. The Decree quieted title in Sweeney Land Company 
as to a portion of the land, Maud Kimball as the successor to 
Gilbert Kimball to a portion of the land and Melvin Fletcher and 
Pe99Y Fletcher to the land upon which their yard, outbuildings 
and driveway are located. (Appendix Exhibit 2 - Summary Chart of 
Claims and Decree) 
Maud Kimball and Sweeney Land Company appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court and the case was transferred to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals, in an opinion filed October 
3, 1988, held: That laches barred Melvin and Peggy Fletcher from 
asserting the co-tenant interest originating with Robert Kimball 
and defending against the adverse possession claim of co-tenant 
Maud Kimball, that estoppel barred Melvin Fletcher and Peggy 
Fletcher from asserting the co-tenant interest originating with 
Robert Kimball and defending against the adverse possession 
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claims of co-tenant Maud Kimball, and that the prescriptive 
easement claims of the Fletchers failed because Melvin Fletcher's 
father had permission to use a parcel of land- which was separate 
and unrelated for access to his adjoining property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March of 1940 Robert W. Kimball and Gilbert J. Kimball 
purchased the disputed parcel of land located in Park City from 
Summit County. Robert moved to Salt Lake City in 1940 (trans, p. 
205, L.8) and Gilbert continued to live in Park City. Gilbert 
paid all the property taxes from 1940 to 1983 cimounting to 
$4,641.65 (Trans, p. 147, L.10). Robert did not convey his 
interest during his lifetime and remained the record owner of a 
50% interest; when he died in 1975 his co-tenant interest passed 
to his heir, Elizabeth Kimball. (Trans, p. 163-164.) 
In 1976 and 1977 Gilbert conveyed his 50% co-tenant interest 
in the parcel by recording two quit claim deeds from himself to 
he and Maud as joint tenants; an original, Appendix Exhibit 5, 
and a correction deed, Appendix Exhibit 6. In each deed he 
acknowledged the purchase by Gilbert and Robert in 1940. After 
1971 the county recorder's records indicated that Robert W. 
Kimball owned a 50% interest and that Gilbert and Maud as joint 
tenants owned a 50% interest. (See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 4, 
Abstract of Title) 
Gilbert took no action to place Robert on notice that he 
claimed adversely to Robert at any time. (Appendix Exhibit 7 -
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Deposition of G. Kimball, p. 51-52) Gilbert did not rely on any 
action or lack of action by Robert at any time. (Appendix Exhibit 
7 - Deposition of G. Kimball p. 51-52) Gilbert and Maud believed 
their payment of taxes entitled them to take Robert's interest. 
(Appendix Exhibit 7 - Deposition of Gilbert Kimball, p. 52.) 
After the purchase of Robert's co-tenant interest from his heir, 
Elizabeth, the Fletchers asked the court to quiet title in them 
and to Maud Kimball as co-tenants. Gilbert and Maud claimed to 
have adversely possessed against Robert and claimed sole owner-
ship. The Fletchers also asked that the co-tenant interests be 
partitioned as the interests of the parties may appear in the 
most logical fashion and tendered payment of the property taxes 
by payment in to court. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held 
that Gilbert's redemption of the property from a preliminary tax 
sale in 1947 was notice to Robert of an adverse claim and gave 
rise to a cause of action by Robert. The Appellate Court held 
that Robert's failure to claim his interest from his co-tenant 
prior to his death constituted unreasonable delay conduct 
prejudicial to Gilbert and Maud Kimball. (Appendix Exhibit 1 -
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals) 
VI 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review for 
the findings of fact by a trial judge. The Court of Appeals 
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totally disregarded the standard which is to review the facts in 
the light most favorable to sustaining the findings of the trial 
court. The reviewing court should resolve the interpretation of 
conflicting facts to be consistent with the findings of the trial 
court. 
The Court of Appeals construed conflicting facts completely 
opposite the findings of fact by the trial court and found facts 
it believed support principles of laches and estoppel. The court 
used its conflicting interpretation of the facts to reverse the 
trial judge, disregarding the version of the facts favorable to 
the Appellants. 
POINT II 
Laches may not be asserted to prevent a defense against a 
claim of adverse possession by a co-tenant. The Appellants 
claimed a co-tenant interest in the disputed parcel. Gilbert and 
Maud presented various theories in opposition to the Appellants' 
ownership: 
1. That the Appellants were barred from asserting owner-
ship by 78-12-7 and 78-12-12 U.C.A. (Adverse possession) 
2. That a delay in the litigation of Robert's interest 
prevented the Appellants from asserting the co-tenant interest. 
3. That the Appellants were estopped by Robert's failure 
to pay taxes from claiming an interest. 
The Appellants defended by proving that no notice of adverse 
possession or intent to exclude Robert was present, that no event 
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occurred giving Robert a legal right adverse to Gilbert and Maud 
where Robert or his successor in interest unreasonably delayed 
and that Robert's failure to pay taxes gave rise to a claim for 
monetary contribution in favor of Gilbert and Maud. 
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that laches prevented 
the Appellants from defending against the Kimballs1 claims. 
POINT III 
Under the facts here, estoppel may not bar a co-tenant from 
defending against a claim of adverse possession. 
The Court of Appeals held that Robert's conduct consisting 
of silence, inaction, and a disputed statement refusing to pay 
taxes were repudiated by the Appellants' assertion of the 
co-tenant real property interest. 
The Court erred in failing to apply the law defining the 
rights of co-tenants in real property matters. A property owner 
can hold title in silence and is not required to take any action 
to hold title in real property. When title is vested it can only 
be divested in certain ways. Robert did not deed the property, 
he was not placed on notice of any matter which would give rise 
to a cause of action, and the assertion of title by one holding 
title cannot be barred by estoppel based on silence and inaction. 
POINT IV 
The Court of Appeals disregarded the evidence of prescrip-
tive easement and mistakenly applied the doctrine of adverse 
possession. The Court below clearly misapplied the law with 
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respect to prescriptive easements and the establishment of a 
prescriptive easement by the Appellants. The opinion below 
discusses the establishment of prescriptive easements in terms 
applying the law of adverse possession. On page 5 of the opinion 
the title of the section of the opinion is "Adverse Possession" 
while clearly the Fletchers claim under the findings of the trial 
court was a claim for a prescriptive easement. The Appellate 
Court used entirely the wrong standard and evaluated the wrong 
issues with respect to the findings of the trial court 
establishing a prescriptive easement. The appellants were never 
awarded any property rights by adverse possession and the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the findings of 
the trial court reinstated with respect to the establishment of 
the Fletchers1 prescriptive easement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS VIEW OF THE 
FACTS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES FOR 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals literally ignored the Findings of 
Fact by the trial court and wrote the facts of this case. The 
standard the Appellate Court should use in reviewing decisions of 
a trial court in a quiet title case is stated in Ash v. State 
"The appellant is required to sustain the 
burden of proving error, and the judgment of the 
trial court will not be disturbed if there be 
substantial evidence in the record to support it" 
1. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, (Utah 1977). 
and is variously stated in a series of decisions by this Court. 
For example, in Scharf v. BMG Corporation: 
"To mount a successful attack on the trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshall all the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings." 
3 
In Cutler v. Bowman: 
"In analyzing these opposing contentions we 
tollow the traditional rule of viewing the evi-
dence and all inferences that can reasonably be 
drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the 
findings made and the conclusions drawn by the 
trial court." 
and in Oberhansly v. Earle: 
"We begin by noting that on appeal the 
decision of the trial court is entitled to a 
presumption of validity. We are required to view 
the evidence and any inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to sustaining the deci-
sion. " 
It is clear that the Court places the burden on the appel-
lant from the trial court, the appellees here, to demonstrate 
that reasonable minds could not agree with the findings by the 
lower court as in Lawrence v. Bamberger 
Railroad Co., 
"When the court has made findings and entered 
judgment thereon as was done here, it is then our 
duty to review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the findings, and they must be 
allowed to stand if reasonable minds could agree 
with them." 
2. Scharf v. BMG Corp, 700 P. 2d 1068, (Utah 1985). 
3. Cutler v. Bowman, 543 P.2d 1349, (Utah 1975). 
4V. Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, (Utah 1977). 
5. Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 
282, P.2d 335, (1955). 
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and in R. C. Tolman Construction Co., Inc. v. Myton Water 
Association, 
"In analyzing the Plaintiff's contentions, it 
is appropriate to have in mind these basic rules 
of review on appeal: that we indulge the findings 
and judgment o± the trial court with a presumption 
of validity and correctness; review the record in 
the light favorable to them; do not disturb them 
if they find substantial support in the evidence; 
and require plaintiff to sustain the burden of 
showing error." 
The Court of Appeals apparently relied upon Acton v. 
7 
Deliran, a case where no findings of fact were prepared. Where 
the facts are contradictory, confusing and inconsistent, the 
Court is justified in not making findings with respect to those 
facts. See R. C. Tolman Construction Co. Inc. v. 
Myton Water Association where the Court refused to find the facts 
as proposed by the Plaintiff. 
The evidence before the trial judge on the issues of laches 
and estoppel quoted by the Court of Appeals, was limited to the 
testimony of Maud Kimball and Gary Kimball. Under the standard 
of review cited above, we should consider this evidence "in the 
light most favorable to the trial judge". 
Maud testified to personally hearing statements by Robert 
Kimball in 1940 and in 1947. In the 1940 statement Robert 
6. R. C. Tolman Construction Co. Inc. v. Myton Water 
Association, 563 P.2d 780, (Utah 1977). 
7. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, (Utah 1987) 
-11-
allegedly said and Maud allegedly personally heard in response to 
a request for tax reimbursement: 
"I want to get out of Park City. I want to move 
away and I want nothing further to do with 
this".(trans, p. 126) 
Maud's testimony at trial on the 1940 statement contradicts 
her deposition testimony. In her deposition she testified that 
the first statement she heard about was in 1947. (Appendix 
Exhibit 10 - Deposition of Maud Kimball, p. 21) Later Maud 
changed her initial testimony reported at page 126 of the 
transcript and testified that the reported 1940 statement 
actually occurred in 1947. (Trans, p. 128) 
The conflict created by Maud's testimony of the 19 47 
statement is that Robert Kimball was not in Park City that year 
according to Elizabeth Kimball. (Trans, p. 208) 
All of Maud's testimony is contradicted by Gilbert at his 
deposition and by her own spontaneous statement during Gilbert's 
deposition. (Appendix Exhibit 7 - Deposition of Gilbert Kimball, 
p. 52) . Gilbert testified that he let the property go to tax 
sale and purchased it from the county in his name on the advise 
of a local judge. There is no evidence of such a tax sale on 
record. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.) 
Gary described in a somewhat vague statement that he heard 
Bob agree with Gilbert's management of the property in 1953. 
Gary does not tell us what Gilbert did or what Gilbert told 
Robert. (Trans, p. 156, L. 10-14) Again, Elizabeth Kimball is 
very sure her husband wasn't in Park City during 1953. 
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The evidence of statements to or from Robert were heavily 
contradicted by the evidence that he was not in the State or that 
such statements were not necessary. The trial court found the 
evidence to be unreliable that Pobert made any of the statements 
supporting laches or estoppel after personally hearing Maud 
Kimball, Gary Kimball and Elizabeth Kimball testify. The find-
ings of the trial court are reasonable under the circumstances, 
based on substantial evidence in the record and are entitled to 
the respect due a judge who has personally seen the witnesses, 
the candor or lack of candor and weighed the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
The trial court here clearly and in detailed Findings of 
Fact set forth the basis for its finding that no evidence was 
present of any intent by Gilbert and Maud Kimball to exclude 
Robert or of any adverse notice to Robert; that Gilbert and Maud 
had not adversely possessed the property against their co-tenant 
Robert W. Kimball and his successors in interest. The Findings 
of Fact of the trial court and the Conclusions of Law are enti-
tled to the presumptions of validity defined in the cases cited 
herein. It is of some interest that the opinion by the Court of 
Appeals does not challenge the Conclusions of Law or claim that 
the court misapplied the law to the facts as it found them. The 
Court of Appeals simply disagreed with the facts as found and 
chose to believe parties it had no opportunity to hear testify or 
see before it. The Court of Appeals did not apply the proper 
standard of review and its decision should be corrected and 
reversed and the trial judge's findings sustained. 
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POINT II 
UNDER THE FACTS HERE, ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BAR A CO-TENANT 
FROM DEFENDING AGAINST A CLAIM OF ADVERSE POSSESSION 
After deciding that laches prevented the petitioners from 
asserting the co-tenant interest of Robert Kimball, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the Fletchers were also estopped from 
asserting Robert Kimball's co-tenant interest against the claim 
of adverse possession. The evidence upon which the estoppel 
finding is based were the same disputed statements recited in 
Point I above and were contradictory, conflicting and found 
unreliable by the trial court. 
The statements attributed to Robert in the Court of Appeals 
opinion are similar to the statements attributed to the co-tenant 
o 
which were found ineffective in Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, where 
the party claiming adverse possession also claimed that his 
co-tenant was estopped from claiming his interest by statements 
that "he wanted nothing further to do with the property and that 
he refused to pay taxes on it" (578 P.2d 520 at page 522). 
Gilbert Kimball claimed that he gave Robert Kimball an 
opportunity to pay property taxes in 1947 and that Robert 
refused. (Deposition of Gilbert Kimball, page 52, Appendix 
Exhibit 6) Every statement attributed to Robert was contradicted 
by testimony from Robert's widow Elizabeth that he was not in 
Park City or the State of Utah during the years the claimed 
statements were made. 
8. Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, (Utah 1978) 
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The allegations upon which the estoppel claim was based were 
immaterial, contradicted and were found to not be fact by the 
trial court. 
The Court of Appeals use of estoppel between co-tenants here 
is contrary to the rule that in order for estoppel to exist there 
must be detrimental reliance by one party upon the acts or 
statements of the other. There is no detrimental reliance by 
Gilbert or Maud Kimball because they did nothing more than pay 
taxes on the property which they had an obligation to do in the 
absence of Robert's controverted statements. The claim of 
estoppel is also contradicted by the recitation in the 19 76 and 
19 77 deeds from Gilbert Kimball to Gilbert Kimball and Maud 
Kimball (Appendix Exhibits 5 and 6) that Gilbert was conveying 
the interest he received with Robert Kimball in the 1940 deed 
from Summit County. Reliance by Gilbert and Maud Kimball on the 
silence and inaction of Robert Kimball certainly could not give 
rise to a claim of estoppel because Robert was not required to 
come forward or take any action to protect his interest in the 
absence of notice that Gilbert and Maud intended to adversely 
9 
possess against him. In Olwell v. Clark this Court held that 
mere length of time and exclusive possession alone is insuffi-
cient to find conduct creating a cause of action against a 
9. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, (Utah 1982) 
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co-tenant and adverse possession. The Court held that in Utah 
the action of paying taxes and preserving title is presumed to be 
for the benefit of all co-tenants and does not exclude other 
co-tenants or give them a right of action. The same is true 
respecting possession and use of the property by one party or the 
reputation one party may enjoy as sole owner of the property. 
Established Utah law requires a relationship of confidence 
and trust between co-tenants which is inconsistent and not 
compatible with the claims of estoppel and laches found by the 
Utah Court of Appeals. Because the Utah Court of Appeals failed 
to recognize the fiduciary standard between co-tenants and 
acknowledge this relationship in its discussion of the issues, 
the Court of Appeals has applied the law in a manner that is in 
conflict with many decisions of this Court. 
POINT III 
LACHES MAY NOT BE ASSERTED TO PREVENT A DEFENSE 
AGAINST A CLAIM OF ADVERSE POSSESSION BY A CO-TENANT 
The Utah Court of Appeals found that the petitioners were 
barred by laches from asserting the co-tenant interest orig-
inating with Robert W. Kimball against a claim of adverse pos-
session. 
The law in Utah is fairly well settled on the legal princi-
ples governing relations between co-tenants. In Olwell v. 
Clark (Supra p. 15) the facts were similar to the facts here; 
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one co-tenant paid all the taxes on the property and the original 
grantee of the co-tenant interest died without mentioning the 
property in his estate. This Court in Olwell summarized a long 
line of Utah cases and held that co-tenants exist in a 
relationship of confidence and trust, that the payment of taxes 
by one inures to the benefit of both and that a co-tenant has no 
notice or reason to believe that the payment of taxes by another 
co-tenant is adverse in any way. The Utah Court of Appeals 
decision below is in direct conflict with the principles 
described in Olwell v. Clark and in many other consistent Utah 
cases. 
Beginning with the early case of McCready v. Frederickson 
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule that no co-tenant can 
acquire a greater interest against another co-tenant by the 
payment of taxes or purchase at a tax sale; a cause of action for 
reimbursement arises according to their respective shares. 
McCready held that because of the fiduciary relationship between 
co-tenants, the payment of taxes is not an incident causing 
grounds for action by one co-tenant against another. In order 
for laches to apply a party must know of some incident which 
gives rise to a cause of action. In the case of the payment of 
taxes by one co-tenant, a co-tenant who has not paid taxes has no 
10. McCready v. Frederickson, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 316, 
(1912) 
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cause of action against his co-tenant but has a duty of reim-
bursement. Gilbert and Maud could have demanded reimbursement 
and sued for repayment of Robert's share of the taxes but never 
pursued any notice or claim against Robert. The Kimballs did not 
improve the property and did not exclude Robert. 
See: Matthews v. Baker affirming the principle that ten-
ants-in-common stand in a fiduciary relationship to one another. 
12 In Sperry V. Tolley this Court again held that co-tenants 
stand in a fiduciary relationship to one another, that the 
payment by one co-tenant of all taxes and the purchase by a 
co-tenant for taxes did not constitute acts allowing the tax-
paying co-tenant to acquire sole title to the property by adverse 
possession. The Court retained the rule adopted earlier that the 
purchase of a tax title is insufficient to put co-tenants on 
notice. The Court of Appeals decision below is in conflict with 
Sperry v. Tolley where the Court finds that redemption from a tax 
sale is notice for purposes of laches. 
13 In Peiselt v. Heiselt this Court held that co-tenants 
stand in a fiduciary relationship and hold title in trust for 
each other. This Court held that in the absence of the adversing 
co-tenant informing the other co-tenant of its claim of exclusive 
11. Matthews v. Baker, 47 Utah 532, 155 P. 427, (1916) 
12. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P.2nd 542, (1948) 
13. Heiselt v. Heiselt, 10 Utah 2d 126, 349 P.2d 175, 
(1960) 
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ownership, adverse possession could not be used to bar a co-
tenant from asserting title. This Court used the familiar 
language that a tenant in common must "bring it home" to his 
co-tenant and show by the most open and notorious acts that his 
possession is intended to exclude in every way the rights of the 
co-tenant. 
It is appropriate to reiterate that "acquiring title by 
adverse possession" means to rely on the statute of limitations 
(78-12-7 U.C.A.) to bar another from proving title to real 
property. The adverse possession statute of limitations can only 
begin to run against a co-tenant where notice "brings it home" to 
a co-tenant that an ouster is underway. In this case, the 1976 
and 1977 quit claim deeds (Appendix Exhibits 5 and 6) between 
Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball indicated that the claim of 
Gilbert Kimball is founded upon his co-tenant interest with 
Robert W. Kimball. The deed Language constitutes an admission 
that Robert W. Kimball or his successors in interest hold a 
co-tenant interest in the property as of the dates of the deeds. 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals finding that 
laches may be used between fiduciaries where one party has not 
been placed on notice of a recison for taking action is in con-
flict with the law and decisions of this Court in McCready v. -
Fredrickson, Sperry v. Tolley, Heiselt v. Heiselt, and 
Olwell v. Clark and others. The fact that one co-tenant pays 
taxes does not give rise to a cause of action by the non-paying 
-19-
co-tenant. The approval of the Court of Appeals of such a 
procedure is in conflict with the prior decisions of this Court 
with respect to the relationship of co-tenants between one 
another in the question of payment of property taxes and effec-
tively reverses all prior decisions for the appellants. 
POINT IV 
PERMISSION FROM A NON-OWNER OF REAL ESTATE WILL NOT DEFEAT 
THE OPEN NOTORIOUS AND ADVERSE CHARACTER OF USE REQUIRED 
TO ACQUIRE PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS 
The trial court found that a portion of the subject property 
lying between the warehouse parcel and the Coalition Building 
parcel had been used and occupied by the appellants or Mel 
Fletcher for a period in excess of twenty (20) years openly, 
notoriously and adversely to all parties. (Appendix Exhibit 3 
Finding No. 10) The finding is the result of a claim by the 
appellants that as an alternative to the co-tenant interest of 
Robert Kimball, the appellants hold prescriptive rights. Melvin 
and Peggy Fletcher's home is located on a parcel of land 
immediately adjacent to and north of the Roy Fletcher home. To 
the rear of both parcels is the warehouse parcel purchased by 
Gilbert and Robert Kimball in 1940. 
A driveway exists across the south end of the warehouse 
parcel to the rear of the Roy Fletcher parcel. 
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A separate driveway on the opposite end of the adjoining 
parcels exists to the rear of the home owned by Melvin and Peggy 
Fletcher. The two Fletcher parcels (Mel and Roy) are separate 
and distinct adjoining lots. During the course of the litigation 
Gilbert Kimball obtained written statements from Melvin 
Fletcher's brother and sister (Appendix Exhibits 8 and 9) stating 
that Roy Fletcher had permission to use the driveway and the 
adjacent land on the South end to the rear of the Roy Fletcher 
parcel. No testimony from third parties provided any evidence of 
permission to use the north end of the warehouse parcel. 
There was no evidence that prior to 1976 Gilbert Kimball or 
Maud Kimball claimed the land described in Finding No. 10 by the 
Court. Only in 19 76 and in the later 19 77 correction deed did 
Gilbert and Maud Kimball put anyone on notice by the recordation 
of those deeds that they claimed any interest in the land over 
which Mel Fletcher claims prescriptive rights. Mr. Fletcher's 
use of the area for more than 20 years prior to 1976 defined in 
Finding No. 10 was clearly open, notorious and hostile to all 
parties hereby creating a prescriptive easement. See: 
Zollinger v. Frank , Jensen v. Brown , Crane v. Crane . He 
neither sought nor obtained permission from Gilbert Kimball to 
use the parcel because Gilbert Kimball never claimed the parcel 
prior to 1976. Melvin Fletcher purchased the land in 1954 and 
14. Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514 175 P.2d 714, (1946). 
15. Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, (Utah 1981). 
16. Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, (Utah 1984). 
-21-
used the driveway and rear yard portions of the property for 
necessary outbuildings, garage and access to the street 
supporting the finding that he acquired a prescriptive easement. 
See: Malouf v. Fischer 17. Prior to 1976, Gilbert Kimball did 
not claim the area and a party v/ho is not an owner of real 
property cannot give permission to use property to deteat the 
claim of a prescriptive user who has used the property openly, 
notoriously and adversely to all parties. Here, Gilbert Kimball 
attempted to defeat the prescriptive claim of the Fletchers 
defined in the pleadings prior to the purchase of Elizabeth 
Kimball's co-tenant interest. 
The appellants clearly demonstrated grounds for a prescrip-
tive easement as an alternative to continue the use and occupancy 
of the land described in Finding No. 10 by the trial court. The 
Utah Court of Appeals opinion contradicting the trial court is in 
error finding that Gilbert Kimball's permission to Roy Fletcher 
somehow constituted permissive use by Melvin Fletcher of an 
entirely separate and distinct parcel of property. A separate 
and distinct parcel was not claimed by Gilbert and Maud Kimball 
until 1976 and therefore they could not have granted permission 
to use the area to Melvin Fletcher or his predecessor. The Court 
should find that Melvin and Peggy Fletcher have established a 
17. Malouf v. Fischer, 159 P.2d 881, (Utah). 
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prescriptive right as defined by the trial court and that the 
Fletchers are entitled to use their use and occupancy of the land 
described in Finding No. 10 of the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and Decree of Quiet Title on file below. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals deviated substantially from estab-
lished Utah Law in its opinion reversing the decision of the 
trial court. The court below erred in misapplying the principles 
established for the definition of co-tenant relationships in the 
State of Utah, the standard of review in quiet title matters and 
the establishment of a prescriptive easement. For all the 
foregoing reasons, the court should reverse the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals and reinstate the findings of the trial 
court or, in the alternative, require the trial court to make 
specific findings with respect to the laches and estoppel 
defenses proposed by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEPALD H. KINGHORN 
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Gilbert and Maud Kimball, 
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Before Judges Davidson, Billings and Orme. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880080-CA 
F I L E D 
Mc:.yf Kcoain 
Cterk of the Cou*1 
' Utch Coun of Appeals 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
This case involves conflicting claims to several small 
parcels of real property located in Park City, Utah. In 1980, 
the Sweeney Land Company (Sweeney) filed a complaint against 
Gilbert1 and Maud Kimball (Kimballs) in addition to Melvin 
and Peggy Fletcher (Fletchers) seeking to quiet title to 
described land in Sweeney. The Fletchers counterclaimed and 
alleged they had possessed the property "openly, notoriously, 
and adversely for more than seven years and [they] have paid 
the taxes on the same for more than seven years." The 
Fletchers also claimed their use of the land gave them a 
"prescriptive right or incorporeal hereditaments to said lands.' 
1. Gilbert Kimball died during the course of litigation, 
Kimballs were joint tenants in their property interests. 
The 
EXHIBIT 1 
The Kimballs counterclaimed against Sweeney and crossclaimed 
against the Fletchers alleging they were the owners of the 
property as evidenced by a deed and, alternatively, by their 
adverse possession. 
The Fletchers subsequently discovered Gilbert Kimball's 
deceased brother, Robert W. Kimball, allegedly held a cotenant 
interest in the property. Melvin Fletcher obtained a quit-claim 
deed from Robert1 s widow, Elizabeth, and then moved to amend the 
pleadings to claim a cotenant interest with the Kimballs and to 
request the property be partitioned. On February 22, 1984, the 
Fletchers tendered to the clerk of the court one-half the taxes 
on the property from 1942 to 1983 in view of their cotenant*s 
interest. On August 1, 1984, Sweeney and the Fletchers filed a 
stipulation in which the two parties agreed to exchange 
quit-claim deeds concerning their respective interests in the 
parcels. 
Trial to the court was held on September 5 and 6, 1985. A 
later hearing was held concerning objections to the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment and 
decree of quiet title. Subsequently, the Kimballs and Sweeney 
moved for further amendments or for a new trial but were 
denied. We address only those issues .which are dispositive. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) requires that, "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses." We are bound to follow the rule together with 
the Utah Supreme Court's guidance, concerning the validity of 
findings of fact, in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987). This court will "accord conclusions of law no particular 
deference, but review them for correctness." Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Fundamental to this opinion is our acceptance of the 1976 
survey as the description of the property conveyed in the 1940 
tax sale by Summit County to the brothers, Gilbert and Robert 
Kimball. The survey was executed by a licensed land surveyor 
who utilized the most accurate information then obtainable, 
whereas the 1940 tax deed is described in general terms. 
ROBERT W. KIMBALL INTEREST 
The Fletchers1 claim is primarily based on the quit-claim 
deed obtained from Robert W. Kimball's widow, Elizabeth. For 
the quit-claim deed to have any validity, Robert must have been 
a cotenant with Gilbert until his death and Elizabeth must have 
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been Robert's successor in interest. There is no doubt that the 
brothers purchased the property in 1940. Elizabeth testified 
that Robert and she departed Park City in 1940 and never again 
resided in that location. Although Elizabeth stated Robert had 
not been in Utah during 1947 and 1953# she did testify that her 
late husband did make some visits. 
Maud Kimball testified that taxes on the property for the 
years 1942 through 1947 were delinquent, but were redeemed by 
Gilbert Kimball who then made payment on the taxes until his 
death in 1983. She stated that neither Robert nor his estate 
made any contribution for property taxes. Maud further 
testified that she was present in 1940 or 1941 when Gilbert and 
Robert had a discussion relative to the property at issue. When 
Gilbert asked Robert "if he wanted to pay half of the tax," 
Robert is reported as saying, "Hell no, I want to get out of 
Park City. I want to move away, and I want nothing further to 
do with this." Maud also stated that the brothers discussed the 
property in 1947. Maud testified, "My husband Gilbert asked if 
[Robert] wanted to redeem himself and be put back for half of 
the taxes, and he said, no, I'm living in California now, and I 
still want nothing to do with it." When questioned about 
answers given in her deposition taken prior to trial, Maud 
attempted to clear up what appeared tq be discrepancies 
concerning whether she heard the conversations between Gilbert 
and Robert. She also stated that Robert told the Kimballs to 
remove his name from the deed, but because he was on vacation, 
Robert would not go to the county seat and clarify the matter 
with a quit-claim deed. 
Gary Kimball, a son of Gilbert and Maud Kimball, testified 
that, in about 1953, he was present when his father and his 
Uncle Robert discussed property in Park City. A portion of the 
conversation concerned the property at issue. When his father 
told Robert what he had done relative to redeeming the property, 
Gary stated, "[Robert] said it was fine with him. He was out of 
Park City. He was gone for good and had no more interests here." 
Gilbert Kimball's deposition was taken a few months prior to 
his death. In it he stated, "Long before my brother died he 
said he had nothing to do with this property. He refused to pay 
any part of the taxes on it, so we let the property go to 
taxes. And we bought it back in my name [in 1947]," 
Attached to the notice of probate distribution recorded by 
the Fletchers* counsel was the decree of distribution concerning 
Robert's estate. Although the residuary clause refers to "any 
and all other property which may belong to said Estate, whether 
herein particularly mentioned or not," the section dealing with 
real property only refers to Robert's home in Salt Lake City. 
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The court found no evidence that the Kiraballs ever gave 
notice to Robert of their intent to adversely possess the 
property. The court further found that Robert had never 
officially conveyed his interest to the Kimballs. However, the 
court made no findings concerning the extensive evidence showing 
Robert's intent that the Kimballs have the property. No 
evidence was present-*'* *n rebuttal. 
The Kimballs assert that the claims of both the Fletchers 
and Sweeney are barred by the doctrines of laches and estoppel. 
a. Egches 
This doctrine was recently discussed in Borland Bv Dent, of 
Social Serv. v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987), where 
the court stated, "To successfully assert a laches defense, a 
defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably 
delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was 
prejudiced by that delay.- In Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v. 
Suoarhouse Shopping Center Assoc, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), 
the court wrote: 
Although lapse of time is an essential 
part of laches, the length of time must 
depend on the circumstanced of each case, 
for the propriety of refusing a claim is 
equally predicated upon the gravity of the 
prejudice suffered by defendant and the 
length of plaintiffs delay. 
Id. at 1260 (footnote omitted^. 
If we assume Gilbert's redemption of the property in his 
name in 1947 and notification of such redemption to Robert no 
later than the mid-1950fs as giving rise to a cause of action 
by Robert or his successors in interest, approximately 25 years 
passed before any complaint was filed. During this period, the 
Kimballs paid all the property taxes and conducted themselves 
as if they had sole ownership. If Robert believed he still 
possessed a cotenant interest, his failure to claim the 
interest from the Kimballs or to commence an action prior to 
his death must be considered unreasonable and prejudicial to 
the Kimballs. This claim is barred by laches. 
b. EstQPPQl 
Leaver v. Grose. 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980), reports, 
-The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his 
acts, representations, or conduct, or by his silence when he 
ought to speak, induces another to believe certain facts exist 
and such other relies thereon to his detriment (footnote 
omitted).- Additionally, -The elements of equitable estoppel 
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are: 'conduct by one party which leads another party/ in reliance 
thereon# to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his 
conduct.** Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688/ 
691 (Utah 1985)(quoting United American Life Ins. Co. v. zigng 
First Nat'l Bank. 641 P.2d 158/ 161 (Utah 1985)). 
The Kimballs have relied on Robert's renouncement of interest 
in the property and on his continued silence and inaction to the 
time of his death. Robert's successors in interest now repudiate 
his actions and claim that he continued to maintain his status as 
a cotenant. There is little doubt that such repudiation is 
detrimental to the Kimballs. Because Gilbert and Maud believed 
Robert no longer desired an interest in the property/ they did 
not pursue the matter further. If they had been given an 
indication of a change in Robert's position prior to his death/ 
they could have attempted to obtain a conveyance from Robert/ 
obtained an affidavit/ or possibly brought a quiet title action. 
Robert's death rendered any further negotiations or contact with 
him impossible. Due to their reliance/ the Kimballs found 
themselves in court defending title to the property. Even had we 
not found laches to bar this claim, it would be barred by 
estoppel. The Fletchers cannot claim any interest in the 
property because of the quit-claim deed from Robert's widow, 
Elizabeth. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
The court found that the Fletchers' use of a portion of the 
property was adverse to the Kimballs. Specifically/ the trial 
court found the Fletchers' use "was not under any agreement or 
permission from any person or entity." We disagree. To hold a 
finding of fact to be clearly erroneous requires "that if the 
findings . . . are against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings . . . will 
be set aside." State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315/ 317 (Utah App. 
1987)(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191/ 193 (Utah 1987)). 
In Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982)/ the court wrote: 
[I]n order to show successful adverse 
possession/ the claimant must intend to 
acquire title# must by declaration or 
conduct give actual or constructive notice 
to the legal title holder, and must possess 
the property in a manner variously called 
"open," "notorious/" or "hostile" for a 
period of seven years. . . . It is 
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generally agreed that, in order for the 
claimants conduct to give notice, it must 
be conduct that is inconsistent with the 
rights of the owner. 
Id* at 587 (citation omitted). 
Adverse possession cannot arise from use by the claimant 
with the permission of the legal title holder. Hammond v. 
Johnson. 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). The record contains 
overwhelming evidence which indicates the Fletchers had 
permission to use portions of the property. Gilbert, in his 
deposition, states that Melvin Fletcher1s father, Roy, had 
asked him for permission "to use the ground." The permission 
was granted as long as the Kimballs "had no use for it." 
Gilbert further claimed that Roy believed he owed Gilbert rent 
which the latter refused to accept. The deposition asserts 
that Gilbert offered to sell Melvin the property, but the two 
never agreed on a price. Gilbert's deposition refers to an 
exhibit which is a statement written by Juanita Fletcher Love, 
Roy's daughter and Melvin's sister. The statement reflects 
Juanita *s understanding that a portion of the property in 
dispute belonged to Gilbert and was used with his permission. 
Additional mention is made of another exhibit which was also 
received by the trial court, a statement by Marion Fletcher, 
Roy's son and Melvin's brother. This statement indicates that 
Roy's use of the Kimball property was subject to Gilbert's 
revocable permission. Maud testified that the Fletcher family 
always had permission to use a portion of the Kimball 
property. Gary Kimball testified he was present when his 
father, Gilbert, discussed the property with Melvin and the 
latter made an offer of approximately $90,000 - $96,000 for 
it. Also, Melvin Fletcher testified, when asked if his family 
had the permission of the Kimball family to go across the 
property, "In a sense, yes, if they [the Kimballs] owned the 
ground." Melvin*s testimony reveals he offered Gilbert $60,000 
for the property, but had been refused. This evidence shows 
that Melvin's use of the Kimball property was with consent. 
We, therefore, hold that the finding of adverse possession, or 
conduct inconsistent with the rights of the Kimballs, is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The Fletchers have acquired no interest in the Kimball 
Property at issue either through the quit-claim deed from 
Elizabeth or under the doctrine of adverse possession. The 
case is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment 
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consistent with this opinion.2 Any Sweeney claims that are 
based on deeds received from the Fletchers and concern the 
Kimball property# must fail. Title to that property is quieted 
in the Kimballs. There appears to be no reason why the deeds 
between Sweeney and the Fletchers, not affecting the Kimball 
property, should not stand, although the trial court should 
examine this on remand. Each party will bear their own costs 
on appeal. 
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything significant 
to existing law. Additionally, the fact situation is so 
complex that the case might prove confusing to any reader. For 
these reasons this opinion is not to be published in the Utah 
or Batrrfic Reporters. ^ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge' 
ORME, Judge: (concurring specially) 
I agree that this difficult case should be remanded, 
although I am not prepared to go as far as my colleagues in 
defining what the outcome on remand should be. 
2. We find it difficult to follow from the record why the trial 
court signed the judgment and decree of quiet title which does 
not comport with its oral ruling. We realize the trial court 
heard objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and the judgment and decree, but there is nothing before us to 
indicate why the changes from the oral ruling were made. 
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As concerns the issue of Robert Kimballfs widow1s curious 
conveyance to Melvin Fletcher, I also see error in the trial 
court's not making findings "concerning the extensive evidence 
showing Robert's intent that the Kiraballs have the property,* 
While the majority's analysis of the two doctrines is sound, I 
am not# however, persuaded that the evidence shows as a matter 
of law that the Fletchers' claim is barred by laches and/or 
estoppel. As to this part of the dispute, I would simply 
remand with instructions that the trial court make findings 
relative to Robert's comments and conduct and draw any 
appropriate legal conclusions concerning laches and estoppel 
from those findings. 
I concur in Judge Davidson's opinion insofar as it concerns 
the adverse possession issue and the treatment to be accorded on 
remand to the deeds between Sweeney and the Fletchers. 
I share Judge Davidson's puzzlement as reflected in 
footnote 2 of the main opinion. While it is true that *[a]ny 
judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome of a case 
until a decision is formally rendered," Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985), the court's ruling from the bench, 
fresh on the heels of trial, is a product of the court's own 
mental impressions and contemporaneous, neutral assessment of 
the evidence. Subsequently presented* findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, insofar as different from such a ruling, are 
more a product of counsel's view of the case—and sometimes of 
his or her imagination. While a court has every right to alter 
its perception of a case, it should take pains to explain fully 
any differences between its "untainted" ruling from the bench 
and its formal decree. 
Finally, I would order counsel not to disclose this case to 
the Bar Examiner: Committee of the Utah State Bar. They would be 
unable to resist fashioning the next Bar exam's real property 
question after the facts of this case—and such would clearly 
violate the Bar applicants' rights under the eighth amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
„ f£ 
GregoryiC. Or me, Judge 
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Fletcher 
100$ pursuant to tax deed as 
corrected by 1976 correction 
deed, joint tenancy to Maud 
Kimball. 
50$ co-tenant 
interest. 
50$ co-tenancy pursuant to tax 
deed, as corrected by 1976 
correction deedi heirship to 
Elizabeth Kimball Quitclaimed 
to Fletchers. 
I 
100$ 
pursuant 
to parti-
tion by 
court. 
100$ pursuant to 
partition by court. 
Sweeney 
1 
100$ pursuant to United Park 
City Mines Co. Quitclaim Deed, 
50$ co-tenant interest 
pursuant to Quitclaim 
Deed from Fletchers. 
LEGEND: PARCEL 1 — the "Herschiser Parcel". 
PARCEL 2 — the north half of the 30 foot strip. 
PARCEL 3 — the south half of the 30 foot strip. 
PARCEL 4 — the north half of the warehouse parcel. 
PARCEL 5 — "the south half of the warehouse parcel. 
EXHIBIT 2 PAGE1 
Sources of Title to the Subject Parcels as Found by the Court 
Maud 
Kimball 
j 50$ co-tenant 
' interest. (Tax 
deed as cor-
rected by 1976 
correction 
deed and opera-
tion of law at 
death of joint 
tenant G. 
Kimball. No ad-
verse posses-
sion. ) 
1. 
None. (Parti-
tion by Court. 
No adverse 
possession.) 
G. Kimball 
Estate 
None. (Joint 
tenancy inter-
est terminated 
at death.) 
Mr. & Mrs. 
JEl&fcoher— 
Same as parcel 
1. 
Same as p a r c e l 
1 . 
[Same as p a r c e l 
3. 
100$ vested in 
Maud Kimball by 
19^0 tax deed 
as corrected by 
1976 correction 
deed and opera-
tion of law at 
death of joint 
tenant G. 
Kimball. 
Same as parcel 
1. 
[Same as parcel 
1. 
None. ( All:.. • 
interest con-
veyed, to • 
Sweeney Land 
Co. .) 
Same—as narcel 
1. 
Sweeney 
Land 'Co, 
50$ co-tenant 
interest con-
veyance from 
Fletcher. 
100$ vested in 
Fletcher's by 
partition of 
Court. Tax 
deed as cor-
rected by 1976 
correction deed, 
succession 
from Robert 
Kimball and 
Quitclaim Deed 
from Elizabeth 
Kimball. 
Same as parcel 
3. 
None. Parti-
tion by Court. 
Same as parcai 
1. (No adverse 
possession.) 
None. Purport-
ed root of 
title deed 
fails to de-
scribe paircel. 
No adverse 
possession. 
No claim. 
No claim, 
No party appeared to represent interest of Herschiser1s to 
parcels 1,2, and 3. Default entered after service by pub-
lication. 
GERALD H, KINGHORN 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorney for Melvin and Peggy Fletcher 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8644 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR 
NO 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH J?'J £ *F f) 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY, ! 
Plaintiff, ! 
vs. 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL 
et al., 
Defendants. 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL, 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY 
FLETCHER, et al., 
Counter-Crcssclainants. 
NOV 
Clem M
 JU 
BY 
Depur 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
i Civil No. 6211 
5 7SC5 
ar 
Cart •**"*" 
On the 5th day of September, 1985, at 9:00 a.m. the issues 
raised in the pleadings between the parties came on regularly for 
non-jury trial before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, 
at the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah. 
The Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, 
Edward S. Sweeney and Paul D. Veasy of Behle, Has lam and Hatch, 
the defendant, counterclaimant and crossclaimant Maud Kimball was 
present in person and by counsel, Robert M. Felton. Defendants, 
counterclaimants and crossclaimantS, Kelvin and Peggy Fletcher 
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were present in person and were represented by Gerald H. Kinghorn 
of Kapaloski, Kinghorn & Peters. 
Mr. Felton moved the Court for an order excluding witnesses 
from the Courtroom until called to testify. The motion was 
granted and the Court asked that each witness proposed by the 
parties, except the parties themselves, be sworn. The Court then 
admonished the witnesses to not discuss their testimony or the 
testimony of others except with counsel. The proposed witnesses 
were then excluded from the Courtroom. 
Counsel for each party made a short opening statement. After 
the conclusion of the opening statements of counsel, Mr. Felton 
moved the Court for an order granting a judgment of quiet title 
to Maud Kimball for a portion of the property at issue generally 
described as the "Hershiser" parcel. After hearing the arguments 
of counsel, the Court denied the motion with leave to reconsider 
after hearing the evidence. 
The parties presented a written stipulation to the Court 
signed by counsel for each party to permit the admission as 
evidence of the exhibits named in the stipulation, reserving the 
claims of the parties as to the relevance and/or materiality of 
the exhibits. The stipulation is the result of pretrial confer-
ences between counsel for the parties where the stipulated 
exhibits were disclosed, reviewed, investigated and corrected 
where appropriate, to enable the parties to stipulate to the 
admission of the exhibits without the necessity of individual 
witness or document foundation for each exhibit. It is the 
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understanding of the parties on the record that the plaintiffs 
exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 5 are admitted. -£es—illustrative purpeaea* 
•ci:!^ . The Court approved the stipulation of the parties and 
received the exhibits in evidence. 
The Plaintiff called and examined the following witnesses: 
Randy Sorensen, Robert B. Jones, Kelvin H. Fletcher and Edward 
S. Sweeney. 
The Defendant Kimball then called and examined the following 
witnesses: Maud Kimball, Gary Kimball, Robert Ruggeri, Melvin 
Fletcher; the deposition of Gilbert Kimball was considered as 
evidence of the testimony of Gilbert Kimball. The depositions of 
Maud Kimball and Melvin Fletcher were published. 
The Defendants Fletcher then called and examined the follow-
ing witnesses: Les Roach and Elizabeth W. Kimball. 
Following the testimony of the witnesses en behalf of the 
Defendants Fletcher, Defendant Kimball recalled Maud Kimball as a 
rebuttal witness. 
Each party rested and a closing statement was made by 
counsel for each of the parties. At the conclusion of the 
closing statements of counsel, the Court recessed the trial at 
5:30 p.m. on September 5 th to be reconvened at 9:00 a.m. on 
September 6, 19 85 for further proceedings. On September 6 at 
9:00 a.m. trial was reconvened and the Court announced its 
decision in general terms and directed counsel for the Defendants 
Fletcher to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree of Quiet Title based on the evidence. 
OQ-1 
Based upon the testimony in open Court, the documents, 
surveys and affidavits entered into evidence, the candor and lack 
of candor, demeanor of the witnesses and parties and the equities 
in favor of or against each party apparent from the facts and 
circumstances established by the evidence, the Court makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property which is the subject of the claims of 
the parties is located in Elock 53 of Snyders Addition to Park 
City as recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Summit 
County, Utah. 
2. Block 53 of Snyders Addition to Park City as shown by 
the records of the Summit County Recorder was platted as a block 
of land without platting cr dedication of interior streets or 
further subdivision into lots. 
3. The Plaintiff and the Defendants Fletcher signed and 
filed a stipulation dated May 31, 19S4. Sweeney Land Company and 
Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher have performed the execution 
and delivery of the deeds described in the stipulation, 
4. Based on the pleadings herein, the parties claim 
unencumbered fee simple title to certain parcels of land general-
ly described as follows: 
Sweeney Land Co* claims title to a parcel of land approxi-
mately 30 feet in width extending from the east street line of 
Park Avenue in Park City as the westerly boundary, thence in a 
northeasterly direction thirty feet wide for approximately 164 
-4- 3S5 
feet (the 30 foot strip) . Sweeney Land Company has quitclaimed 
15 feet of the 30 foot strip south cf the center line of the 30 
foot strip to the Defendants Fletcher for a distance extending 
from East line of Park Avenue northeasterly for approximately 99 
feet. The Fletchers have quitclaimed the north 15 feet of the 30 
foot strip to Sweeney Land Co. and all the Fletchers interest in 
the "Hershiser" parcel. Sweeney Land Co. did not amend its 
pleadings thereafter, 
Maud Kimball claims a large parcel of land including the 
warehouse area, the 30 foot strip and the Hershiser parcel as 
described more specifically in the Defendant Kimball counterclaim 
and crossclaim. The Kimball claim overlaps the east 65 feet of 
the Sweeney 30 ft. strip claim. The Hershiser parcel is the 
northern-most portion of the land claimed but does net conflict 
with the Plaintiff claim. (The "Hershiser-Kimball Parcel"). 
The Fletchers claim a 50% undivided interest as co-tenants 
with Maud Kimball to the "Hershiser-Kimball" parcel, the South 15 
feet of the 30 foot strip deeded to them by Sweeney Land Company 
and as an alternative claim, a prescriptive easement for con-
tinued use as garage, storage space, parking and ingress and 
egress over, across and through the Hershiser-Kimball parcel 
adjacent to the east of the Fletchers home parcel. The ownership 
of the heme area deeded to the Fletchers by Mary Workman is not 
at issue. 
The present Fletcher claims are defined in the amended 
counter-claim and cross-claim filed by Fletchers after they 
1 n ~ 
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received a deed from Elizabeth W. Kimball in 1983, which de-
scribed the same land as claimed by Maud Kimball. 
5. For at least one hundred years prior to the filing of 
the complaint herein, properties were generally conveyed in the 
area of the subject properties without accurate surveyed or 
dimension specific legal descriptions and under general state-
ments as to the location and dimensions of the subject prop-
erties. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable that the Court 
interpret the legal descriptions contained in the various instru-
ments upon which the parties claims are based in a manner consis-
tent with the physical location of buildings and objects in 
relation to each other, roads, improvements, dimensions described 
in the instruments and the actual possession of the properties by 
the parties and their predecessors in interest. 
7. The 30 foot strip claimed by the Plaintiff Sweeney was 
conveyed to the Sweeney's predecessor, the United Park City Mines 
Co., in 1953 by the Silver King Coalition Mines Company and Park 
Utah Consolidated Mines Ccmpany by a deed which described the 
property as a 30 foot strip of land which began at the easterly 
side of Park Avenue and extended in a northerly direction for an 
indefinite distance to a point generally stated as a right-of-way 
granted under a specific deed dated November 13, 1883. The 
November 13, 1883 deed described in the conveyance to United Park 
City Mines Co. is not of record and there is no evidence cf the 
terms or specific location of the right of way described in the 
missing deed. In 1953 when the deed to United Park Mines was 
executed and delivered, the scalehouse and warehouse described in 
the legal description of the 30 foot strip were not in existence 
and therefore the northeasterly boundary of the 30 foot strip 
could not be identified. 
8. In 1940 Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert Kimball purchased 
from Summit County certain interests in land in the area of the 
Hershiser-Kimball parcel. The area had been purchased in 1928 by 
Robert W. Kimball, the father of Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert 
Kimball. Robert W. Kimball conveyed the property to Robert T. 
Kimball. Robert and Gilbert thereafter deeded the property in a 
mortgage-deed transaction as security f<?r a loan. Taxes on the 
property were not paid and the property ultimately was purchased 
by Summit County for taxes. In 194 0 Robert T. Kimball and 
Gilbert Kimball purchased the Eershiser-Kimball parcel from 
Summit County under a general legal description which did not 
completely and accurately describe the dimensions of the area 
Summit County intended to convey and the Kimballs intended to 
purchase. 
Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert Kimball were brothers and 
business partners in the Kimball service station and garage. In 
1976, the Defendant Kimball commissioned a survey by Robert Jones 
of the property owned pursuant to the deed from Summit County 
executed and delivered in 1940 to Gilbert Kimball and Robert T. 
Kimball. The 1976 Jones survey accurately depicts the property 
intended to be conveyed to the Kimball brothers in 1940 by Summit 
County. 
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9. The plaintiff received a quitclaim deed from United 
Park City Mines in 1980 containing a land description which 
partially overlaps the property claimed by the Defendants 
Fletcher and Kimball; the Plaintiffs were on notice by virtue of 
the recordation of the deed by the Defendant Kimball of the 
cverlap and the actual occupation and historic use of the area by 
Fletcher that title to the 30 foot strip was disputed. The 
Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest used and occupied no 
more than the north 15 feet of the 30 foot strip, for a distance 
of 99 feet extending from the easterly right of way line of Park 
Avenue. 
10. Portions of the property claimed by Sweeney Land Co. 
and Kimball have been used and occupied by the Defendants 
Fletcher for a period in excess of 20 years openly and notorious-
ly. The use of the Hershiser-Kimball property by the Defendants 
Fletcher and the Fletchers predecessor in interest was not under 
any agreement or permission from any person or entity. There is 
no credible evidence that the Fletchers use was not adverse to 
Kimballs and all others and therefore the use by Fletchers was 
and is adverse to the Kimballs. The area used and occupied 
openly, notoriously, adversely, and exclusively by the Defendants 
Fletcher is generally described as that area lying North of a 
line beginning at the Southeast corner of the land conveyed to 
Melvin H. Fletcher by his predecessor in interest and proceeding 
therefrom at a bearing of North 61° 10f East across the Kimball 
property to the gravel road depicted on the exhibits a distance 
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of approximately 71 ft. with the exception of a small stucco 
building located on the property which has been used by the 
Defendant Kimball since approximately 1940. No portion of the 
property described by the Kimball counterclaim has been occupied 
by the Kimballs with the exception of the stucco building in-
dicated on the Exhibits within the last forty years. 
The Defendants Fletcher occupied the area of the 30 foot 
strip claimed by the Defendants Kimball for a period in excess of 
20 years and used the area for commercially valuable purposes 
including ingress and egress to their property, for parking of 
vehicles, for garage purposes and foy the storage of household 
materials, garden utensils, hunting equipment and other miscella-
neous, personal property. 
11. The Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest paid 
property taxes for an area which was indefinite and therefore the 
Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof that the 
Plaintiff paid property taxes on the entire 30 foot strip as 
claimed in the complaint. The payment of property taxes by the 
Plaintiff was consistent with the claims of the other parties and 
the legal description in the deed to United Park City Mines in 
1953. 
12. The Kimballs paid property taxes from 1977 to the 
present on the entire parcel described in the survey of property 
by Robert B. Jones. 
13. Based on the testimony of Maud Kimball and the rele-
vant deed language Gilbert J. Kimball and Maud Kimball intended 
9
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to create a joint tenancy interest between themselves by the 
execution and recordation of the deeds. Gilbert Kimball died 
prior to the trial of the matter and his joint tenant Maud 
Kimball survived him. 
14. There is no evidence that Gilbert J. Kimball, Maud 
Kimball or any party on their behalf ever provided notice of any 
kind to Robert W. Kimball or his successors to the effect that 
Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball intended to adversely possess 
the Kimball parcel as against Robert W. Kimball; there is no 
instrument or other evidence of the conveyance of the co-tenant 
interest of Robert W. Kimball to Gilbert Kimball or Maud Kimball 
or conveyance of the interest of Robert W. Kimball to any party 
other than by operation of law to Robert's heir, Elizabeth 
Wilkins Kimball. In 1976, (the date of death of Robert W. 
Kimball) Robert Kimball had not received notice of any act of 
adverse possession or executed any instrument to convey the 
Kimball parcel; Robert Kimball possessed an undivided 50% 
interest in the Hershiser-Kimbail parcel as more correctly 
described in the Robert B. Jones survey which is of record. 
15. Since 1942 Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball have paid 
the property taxes on the Hershiser-Kimbail parcel including the 
taxes due November 30, 1983 in the total amount of $4,641.66. 
The record shows that en or about February 15, 1984, the 
Fletchers tendered the sum of $2,320.83 to the Defendant Kimball 
by check to the Clerk of the Court where the funds tendered are 
on deposit. The Defendants Fletcher are indebted to the 
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Defendant Kimball for one half of the amount of all property 
taxes paid by the Defendant Kimball which 'is the sum of $2,320.83 
not including taxes for the years 1984 and 1985. The Defendants 
Fletcher owe an amount equal to one half of the property taxes 
for 1984 and 1985 to Maud Kimball. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact the Court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The claim of each party must be sustainable on its own 
merits. Each claim should be evaluated based on a root of title 
or title by adverse possession where appropriate* The terms of 
the stipulation are reasonable and the stipulation should be 
approved and recognized by the Court and where otherwise appro-
priate made a part of the Decree of Quiet Title herein. 
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of quiet title as 
its sole property to a strip of land north of the centerline of 
the 30 foot strip for a distance of 99.03 feet from the east 
right-of-way line of Park Avenue as platted in the plat of 
Snyders Addition to Park City. The Plaintiff may be entitled to 
a decree quieting title in the Plaintiff to a 50% undivided 
interest with Kaud Kimball in the Hershiser parcel deeded to the 
Plaintiff by Defendants Fletcher together with a 50% undivided 
interest in the 15 feet North of the centerline of the 30 foot 
strip deeded to the Plaintiff by the Defendants Fletcher* 
Because the pleadings of the Plaintiffs do not state a claim for 
quiet title as a co-tenant with Maud Kimball or for partition of 
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the co-tenant interests the decree herein should not define an 
interest other -than the interest of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, 
3. The Defendants Kelvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher are 
the successors-in-interest to the co-tenant interest of Robert W. 
Kimball as conveyed to them by his heir Elizabeth W. Kimball. It 
is reasonable that the interests of the co-tenants be partitioned 
in a manner consistent with the reasonable use of the property by 
each co-tenant and in a manner which will preserve the economic 
value for each party in a roughly equal manner. The decree of 
quiet title should partition the Eershiser-Kimball parcel to 
quiet title in Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher to the portion 
of the Eershiser-Kimball parcel described as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 23°38f West 
85.97 feet and North 33°26f West 46.70 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Block 7, Amended 
plat of Park City in Section 16 Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and South 61°10f West, 73.16 feet 
and North 28° 50" West 55.7 feet to the true 
point of beginning; 
Thence along the following courses and 
distances: North 28°50f West along the East 
boundary of the land conveyed to Melvin 
Fletcher by Mary Workman a distance of 60.6 
feet, thence North 61°10f East 61.93 feet, 
thence South 43° 13f East 15 feet, thence 
South 33°25f East 47.6 feet more or less, 
thence South 61o10' West 70 feet mere or less 
to the true point of beginning. 
4. The area of the Hershiser-Kimball parcel which is South 
of the Fletcher partition parcel described above should be 
partitioned to Maud Kimball as her sole and separate property. 
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Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball were joint tenants in the 50% 
undivided interest purchased by Gilbert in 1940 and therefore 
upon Gilbert's death any interest of Gilbert terminated and Maud 
became the sole owner of the 50% undivided interest in the 
Hershiser-Kimball parcel. A decree of quiet title should issue 
to Maud Kimball as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 23° 38' West 
85.97 feet and North 33° 26' West 46.7 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Block 7, amended 
plat of Park City, Utah in Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 61° 10' West 
73.16 feet, thence North 28° 50' West 55.7 
feet, thence North 61° 10' East, 70 feet more 
or less, thence South 33° 25f' East, 58 feet 
more or less to the point of beginning. 
Maud Kimball should also be decreed a 50% undivided interest 
as a co-tenant with Sweeney Land Company as the owner of a 50% 
undivided interest in the Hershiser parcel as described in the 
exhibits and to the balance of the land north of the extended 
center line of the 30 foot strip immediately adjacent to the 
parcel of land quieted to Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher 
above. 
5. It is reasonable that each party bear its own attorneys 
fees and costs and therefore no award of attorneys fees or costs 
should be made to any party against the other. 
DATED t h i s 
_J$r&Y of nr»" 'hfir , 1 9 8 5 . BY THEATCUFT 
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- j *« Moi-o-i'n F le tcher bv Mary Workman a d i s t a n c e of conveyed t o Melvin F le tcner Dy * t h e n c e South 
6 0 . 6 f e e t , t h e n c e North 61 10 E * s t . . b l . : ; r 9 c 7 -.' t 4 7 6 f e e t 
47« 1 3 ' East 15 f e e t , thence South 33 25 East 4 / . b t e e t 
more or l e s s , Whence South 6 1 - 1 0 ' West 70 f e e t more o r l e s s 
t o t h e t r u e p o i n t of beginning . 
Each par ty i s t o bear t h e i r own c o s t s and a t t o r n e y s f e e s . 
_ ^ d JSL DATED t h i s 'day of-Ce^efetjr4; 1985. 
BY THE cAjRT: 
3KV SAGE 3 0 0 - 3 -
Western States Title Company 
P.O. Box 714, Part, City, Utah 84060 
Telephone 301^49-^777 
Page No- 9 1 
SUMMIT COUNTY, A QUIT CLAIM DEED 
municipal corporat ion 
of t h e ' S t a t e of Utah Entry Ho. 66568 
Recorded March 22, 194.0 
- t o - Sock G, Page 224. 
Dated March 22 , 1940 
GIL3ERT J . KIMBALL and Cons: $43.00 and $2.00 for 
R03ERT W. KIMBALL, the deed 
CCNVSY & QUIT CLAIMS: 
All i t s r i g h t , t i - l e and I n t e r e s t acqui red under t ax s a l e 
for the years 1932-3-5-7-?, the following desc r ibed p roper ty in 
Summit County, Utah, t c - v i t : 
98 fee t by 77 feet en Block 53 of SnyderTs Addition to Park 
C i ty , Utah. 
The above property vas sold for de l inquent t axes for t h e 
years 1932,3 ,5 ,7 and 1933 inclusive in the name of Sydney Mulcock 
and an aud i to r s deed taken by Summit County. 
This deed i s made under au thor i ty of Sec t ion 80-10-68 
Revised S ta tes of Utah, 1933 and pursuant to en order of the Board 
of County Commissioners, dulv passed on the 4 th day of March, 
1930. 
Witness: iigned: SUMMIT COUNTY, a municipal 
Chas L. F ros t corporat ion of the S ta te of Utah y 
(S E A L) 3y: John E. Wright Clerk 
Ack!d March 22, 1940, regularly before Kae R. Tree , County Recorder, 
(Seal) 
(SHOWN FOR INFORMATION) 
EXHIBIT 4 
•c U.rmf»U$ . 
fcr D^iaak » - r «w? 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
GXLBIJtT J . KIMBALL AMD MAUD KIMBALL, BIS WIPE, grantor* 
• £ * • £ * C i t y , . Canary ef B m i t ,
 t Stmt* o< Utah, kr«by 
QUIT-CLAIM m 
GXLBZXT J . KIMBALL AMD MAQO KIMBALL, B2I WXPK, AS JOINT TENANTS WITH 
FULL BIGBTS QT BUPVJVQBSHXP, 
** Park C i t y , Cooaty of BtaaUt, S t a t e of Utah for d» »un oc* 
W * * * * DOLLARS. 
Bad o t h e r food Bad valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
t f c t fc l .n i .g l 1 loaac aikadni txmmLt Coenty. 
Beginning a t B po int Horth 23* 38* Wast S3.97 f e a t f r o * t h e 
Boetheaat c o r w r o f Block 7, Aaended P l a t o f Park C i t y in S e c t i o n 1 6 , 
T o w u M p 2 South, Banga 4 Xaat, Bait LaJtc Base and Meridian and 
raaioa thonoe Booth 41* 10' M a t 73 .14 f e e t ; t h e n c e North 28* ! 
128 .59 f e e t ; thanca Worth 41* 10 9 Eaat 3 3 . 9 0 f w t ; t h e n c * North 
2 f SO* ttast 30 .00 faa t i thaaoa North *4* l l 9 Baat 17 .00 f e e t ; t h e n c e 
• o v t h 4 3 # 13 9 Baat 34.50 f e e t ; thanca Bouth 33* 25* Eaat 1 0 3 . 3 0 f e a t 
t o t h e p o i n t o f beginning and being tha ***** p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d i n 
tfcat c e r t a i n Quit-Claim Deed f r o * Boacdt County, g r a n t o r , t o G i l b e r t 
J . El • h a l l and Bobert V. Kimball, g r a n t o r s , racordad in the r e c o r d s 
o f t h e Beamit County Beoorder on March 22 , 1940 i n Book G of Q u i t - d a i a 
Deede , p .224 ,ns Entry Ho. 44541 and daacribed t h e r e i n aa 98 f e e t by 
77 f e e t on Block 5 3 , Bayders Addition and bear ing S e r i a l No. RA-34 8. 
IWhy hie. . ^ J £ « 5 T .Bo3i . . . ,A!*'7-
Tri*Kiu the haeda?f mU gnoxmn
 9 the third day of 
December, , A, D. ace Aniaaid aias huedml ind e e v e n t y - s i x 
Maui Kinba l l , h i s w i f e C'J 
~/r, Jf,.< /.// *< 
STATE OF UTAH, \ ^ 
t } Cmmrjot Suaemit J <"0 
On tha third cUfof December A. D. ona TT^  
theeeaeo1 etaa heaJgei *ad .aevaaty-aix pcnocuDy tppeared Wort m« Q 
GZUEBTOV KJMBXLL-.ABD KAUD KIM3ALL, hia wife, o 
. ^ r* % • * . m 
tha PV—a»f CJM AbtyoUg lmrv\wm4\j\ who AJy jckxxnrUgt co XZM that t h«y rxecuerd the 
. *j< .?... • CVV A-l:-tz.~ £ J*?* * t^ r. Nocorr labile. 
EXHIBIT 5 
Western States Title Company 
P.O. Box 714, Park, Cify, Utah 84060 
Telephone 801-649-8777 
Page No, 1C2 
GILBERT J. KIMBALL and 
MAUD KIMBALL, his wife, 
-to-
GIL3ZRT J, KIMBALL AND 
MAUD KIMBALL, lis wife, 
as joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship, 
CORRECTED QUIT CLAIM DEED 
Entry No. H0155 
Recorded Sept. 7, 1977 
Book K-99, Page 504 
Dated Sept._, 1977 
Cons:$10.CO and other gccd 
and valuable consideration. 
QUIT CLAIM: 
Beginning at a point North 23 degrees 331 v/est 55.97 feet 
and North 33 degrees 25' V/est 46.70 feet from the Southeast corner 
of Block 7, Amended Plat of Park City in Section 16, Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 61 degrees 10f V/est 73.16 feet; thence North 2S deg-
rees 50* V/est 123.59 feet; thence North 61 degrees 10* East 33.90 
feet; thence North 23 degrees 50! West 30.00 feet; thence North 
64 degrees 11! East 17.CO feet; thence South 43 degrees 131 East 
56.50 feet; thence South 33 degrees 25! East 103.30 feet to the 
point of beginning and being the sane property described in that 
certain Quit Claim Deed from Summit County, grantor, to Gilbert 
J. Kimball and Robert V. Kimball,grantors, iscorded in the records 
of the Summit County Recorder on March 22, 1940, in Book G of 
Quit Claim Deeds, P. 224, as Entry No. 66563 and described therein 
as 93 feet by 77 feet on Block 53, Snyders Addition and bearing 
Serial No. SA 343. 
This Deed is executed and delivered to correct an error in 
the description of the real property described in that certain 
Quit Claim Deed executed by the iove named grantors on December 3 
1976, in favor of the ebove named grantees and recorded in the 
records of the Summit County Recorder on December 3, 1976, in Book 
M-37,Page 497, thereof, being Entry No. 135034* 
Signed and Acknowledged regularly. 
EXHIBIT 6 
luuncirmofi 1 
4 
1 A I don't remember. 
2 Q Did he make out a deed to you for this property 
3 before he passed away? 
A No. No. 
5 I Q Did he have a will? 
6 A No. Long before my brother died he said he had 
7 nothing to do with this property. He refused to pay any part 
of the taxes on it, so we let the property go to taxes, 
g I And we bought it back in my name, 
10 J MRS. KIMBALL: And it was Judge Robert McCor.ouch, 
U | who told us how to do it. 
12 I Q (By Mr. Kinghorn) Sometime ago, back after your 
8 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
father bought this property where the warehouse w a s — 
A Yes. 
Q —where the stucco shed i s now; i s t h a t correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he sell it or did you and your brother sell it 
to a man named Sid Mulcock? 
A We put it up for security when we built the garage. 
Q Did you ever sign a warranty deed to Sid Mulcock 
on that property? 
A What? 
Q Did you ever deed that property to Sid Mulcock? 
A Yes. We put it up for security to Sid Mulcock. 
Q But you deeded it over to Sid Mulcock, didnft you? 
CAPITOL REPORTERS. P. O BOX U77. SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84110, (801) 363-7939 
EXHIBIT 7 5 2 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I, Marion G. Fletcher, of Salt Lake City, Utah, do 
hereby declare that I am the son of Roy Fletcher, formerly a 
resident of Park City, Utah. This document relates to property 
of Roy Fletcher known as the Park Avenue property. 
During the lifetime of my father, I had discussions 
with him regarding this Park Avenue property and the use by him 
of the adjacent Kimball property. The legal description and a 
pictorial survey of the Kimball property is displayed on the 
page attached hereto. My father acknowledged the ownership of 
the Kimball property by Gilbert John Kimball and Maude S. Kim-
ball, his wife, having stated that his vise of the roadways and 
buildings and his use of the Kimball property was by pennission 
of Gilbert J. Kimball under a revokable agreement my father had 
worked out with him. The above recitation has also always been 
my understanding of the matter. 
It was my father's understanding that at any time 
Gilbert J. Kimball would request, the improvements placed on 
the Kimball property would be subject to removal by my father 
without compensation, and use of the Kimball property discontin 
Dated this £ (, day of Or. i\ / , 19 8 
MARION G. FLETCHER 
Signed and delivered 
in the presence of: 
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about this property that is involved in the litigation? 
A Now, shall I answer? 
MR. FELTON: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: No, I didn't. 
MR. FELTON: Answer his question. Have you talked 
to Bob about it? 
Q (BY MR. KINGHORN) Have you ever talked to Bob 
about it? 
A I didn't but Gib did and repeated it to me. 
Q When did Gib tell you he had talked to Bob about 
this property? 
A Well, it would be 1947. 
Q Okay. 
A They were living in California and they came back 
to Utah on their vacation and they always dropped in to see 
us. 
Q Did they drop in to see you in 194 7? 
A In Park City, yes, and I remember the date accurate 
because, as I told you before, I had been very ill in Holy 
|Cross Hospital. I was recuperating and they came in to see me 
Q Did you hear a discussion at that time between Gib 
|and Robert, and Bob? 
A I did not hear it but Gib told me about it. 
Q Okay. 
A And Bob n e v e r r e f u t e d i t . He came many t i m e s u n t i l 
21 
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his death. Now, this is what Gilbert told me that Bob said. 
Q In 1947? 
A 1947. 
Q Okay. 
A He said, "Bob, I paid all the taxes on this 
property for the last seven years. Would you like to pay youij 
half?" And Bob said, "I don't want anything further to do 
with Park City. I am through with it. You get my name off 
of there." And Gib said, "All right. Let's go to Coalville 
and have it done." And Bob said, "I am on my vacation. I am 
not going to fool around with attorneys and all of that mess.' 
He said, "I am not going to give one day of it. Just take my 
name off as best you can." 
Q Do you know if anything was done after that to get 
Bob's name off? 
A When Gib—we had very little money. They had a 
salary. 
Q Okay. Just tell me if anything was done after thatj 
to get Bob's name off the title. 
A The taxes were not paid for five years. They took 
"The Park Record" in California. They saw that property was 
up for sale. They did not try to retrieve it. When it came 
up for sale, I didn't want it to go and I bought—I sent the 
check to Coalville and paid for it. Park City was a ghost tov\jn, 
it had no value then, and I think it was around $50.00, or 
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something, I don't remember. And then they had, it was a 
quit claim deed they gave to me. I thought it should have gorj* 
to me. I paid for it. Bob's name should have been off of it 
and Gib's too. But they had three years to redeem it. They 
had eight years, five years. This was on a tax sale in "The 
Park Record" that they took and three years later after the 
quit claim deed came, they could have redeemed it. They had 
eight years to redeem that property if they had wanted it but 
they didn't want it evidently. 
Q And so that is your recollection of how— 
A It is the truth. 
Q Okay. The record, by the way, doesn't show anythirjg 
like that happening. 
A I don't know why it shouldn't. I sent the check in1 
Q Well, I am just telling you that in terms of what 
is written down. 
A In 44 years they have not paid one cent of taxes. 
Q I understand that. 
A My taxes on that last year was $1,226.29. 
Q I understand that. So it has been your understanding 
since that— 
A It has been my knowledge. 
MR. FELTON: Let him finish, Maud, please. 
Q (BY MR. KINGHORN) It has been your opinion, based 
on what happened, that Robert Kimball's name has not been 
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